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Abstract Median voter theorem has been used in many economic environments
including law enforcement. Assumptions of the median voter theorem, however, are
generally violated in lawenforcementmodels.Moreover, it is impossible to have agents
with “opposite equilibrium preferences” over enforcement levels in law enforcement
models. These limitations on the use of preferences over law enforcement raises ques-
tions about the robustness and validity of law enforcement models.
Keywords Public enforcement · Equilibrium preferences ·
Enforcement equilibrium · Median voter theorem · Single-peaked preferences ·
Single-crossing property
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1 Introduction
Law enforcement is among the key elements of a civil society that ensures the achieve-
ment of a higher social welfare. Since Becker (1968) has introduced an economic
analysis of law enforcement, there has been a vast literature on economics of crime
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and punishment.1 In public enforcement of law models, the state determines the level
of enforcement expenditures, hence the probability of detecting violators, and fines
for harmful acts. Then, the law enforcement monitors the activities of agents, detects
and fines the violators. As the enforcement expenditures increase, the likelihood of
violators being detected and fined increases.
There are various ways the state can determine the enforcement expenditures as
well as fines. One recent approach is to use majority voting. In the majority voting,
policy x is socially preferred to policy y if there is a majority of voters who prefer x to
y. The median voter theorem states that if preferences satisfy single-peakedness, then
themost preferred alternative of the resulting social preference coincideswith themost
preferred alternative of the median voter (Black 1948; Moulin 1980). An alternative
characterization of the aforementioned median voter theorem is given in Gans and
Smart (1996) using the single-crossing property on preference profiles. Traxler (2009,
2012), Besfamille et al. (2013), and Bethencourt and Kunze (2015) apply the median
voter theorem to the tax enforcement problem to determine the enforcement level. In
the context of enforcement of illegal immigration, Garca (2006), and Facchini and
Testa (2014) use the median voter theorem to determine the enforcement level. These
aforementioned authors either use single-peaked preferences assumption2 or single-
crossing property3 of preference profiles to be able to apply the median voter theorem.
In this paper, I question the applicability of the median voter theorem to the law
enforcement problem to determine either one of the two dimensions of the enforce-
ment level. I show that the use of preferences over enforcement levels (enforcement
expenditures as well as fines) has important limitations. I derive individual equilib-
rium preferences over enforcement levels (enforcement expenditures and fines) in a
specific enforcement environment (see Polinsky and Shavell 1984) and over enforce-
ment expenditures in a general enforcement environment (see Polinsky and Shavell
1992). In the specific enforcement model, there is one harmful act agents can take,
and the enforcement agency monitors agents, detects violators with some probability,
and fines them. On the other hand, in the general enforcement model, there are various
acts, and each agent commits one of these acts. The enforcement agency monitors all
of these acts, detects violators of all kinds with some probability, and fines them at
levels depending on harms caused by their acts. In an enforcement equilibrium (of both
of these models), given the enforcement level (fines and the enforcement expenditure,
which determines the level of monitoring/detection), each agent decides whether to
engage in the harmful act. Given the level of enforcement, an agent’s expected utility
depends not only on his own action but also on actions of other agents. This is because
other agents’ actions determine the harm he faces, and affect fine revenues used to
finance public enforcement along with taxes collected.
Example 1 in Sect. 2 gives a range of agents’ benefits (from the harmful act)
who have double-peaked preferences, violating the single-peakedness condition suf-
ficient for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium in the median voter theorem.
1 See Polinsky and Shavell (2000) and Polinsky and Shavell (2007) for recent literature surveys.
2 See Black (1948) and Moulin (1980).
3 See, for example, Gans and Smart (1996) on the sufficiency of single-crossing property for the existence
of a majority voting equilibrium.
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Moreover, single-crossing property of preference profiles, which is also sufficient
for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium, is also violated. The example is
quite general and hence it provides insight to problems with these assumptions in
law enforcement models. Theorem 1 shows that in the specific enforcement model,
in any society it is impossible to have agents with opposite equilibrium preferences
over enforcement expenditure or fine level, i.e., in equilibrium, if there is an agent who
prefers higher enforcement expenditure (fine level) to less, then there cannot be another
agent in the same society who prefers less enforcement expenditure (fine level) to a
higher one. In the general enforcement model, Theorem 2 shows that in any society it
is impossible to have agents with opposite equilibrium preferences over enforcement
expenditure, i.e., in equilibrium, if there is an agent who prefers higher enforcement
expenditure to less, then there cannot be another agent in the same society who prefers
less enforcement expenditure to a higher one.
In order to determine the enforcement levels (enforcement expenditures and fines),
alternative objectives for the state have been proposed in the economics of law enforce-
ment literature. For example, in Becker (1968) the objective of social planner is to
minimize social cost, which consists of harms caused by agents, costs of detection,
and the costs of punishment to the criminals less gains of criminals. Agents and
their choices are implicitly explained, and they get utility from consumption, and
face uncertainty because of the possibility of getting caught. Cooter and Ulen (2008)
(p.510) suggest that the aim of the law maker is to minimize social cost but it consists
of costs of protection and the net harm caused, i.e. social loss, while the crime is
committed. In Polinsky and Shavell (1984),4 on the other hand, the objective of the
law maker is to maximize total expected utility of agents in the society. The expected
utility of an agent consists of his gain from engaging in the harmful activity, expected
loss due to the possibility of getting caught, expected loss due to the possibility of
being a victim of a crime, and the per capita cost of enforcement. If the agent does not
engage in the harmful activity, then the expected utility will not include the gain from
engaging in harmful the activity, and the expected punishment.
In Sect. 2, the specific enforcement model, including the formal definitions of
enforcement equilibrium, equilibrium expected utility, and the results in this envi-
ronment are given. Example 1 in Sect. 2 shows violations of single-peakedness and
single-crossing property. General enforcement model and themain result in this model
are given in Sect. 3.
2 Specific enforcement model
There is a unit measure of agents in the society. Each agent i ∈ [0, 1] is risk neu-
tral, and decides whether to engage in an act to receive benefit of vi > 0 and cause
harm h > 0, which is the same across all agents. Benefits of agents in the society
are distributed with g(·), a continuous probability density function, and a cumula-
tive distribution function G(·). Law enforcement monitors the actions of agents and
detects each agent engaging in the harmful act with probability p(c) ∈ [0, 1] when
4 See also Polinsky and Shavell (1979).
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the enforcement expenditure is c. Probability of detection p(·) is assumed to be a con-
tinuously differentiable increasing function of enforcement expenditure c, i.e. p′ > 0.
If an agent is detected committing the act, he then pays a fine of f . The fine level f
does not exceed any agent’s budget w, i.e. f ∈ [0, w]. Enforcement level (c, f ) is a
pair of enforcement expenditure c and fine f . The revenue from the fines collected
at enforcement expenditure c is assumed to be equally shared by all agents in the
society. Given the probability of detection p(c) and fine level f , each agent i engages
in the harmful activity if vi ≥ p(c) f and receives the net benefit of vi − p(c) f . If
vi < p(c) f , then he does not engage in the harmful activity, and receives 0.
Given enforcement level (c, f ) ∈ [0,∞) × [0, w], each agent i has equilibrium
expected utility5
Eu∗i = max{0, vi − p(c) f } − h
∞∫
p(c) f




While the expression p(c) f
∫ ∞
p(c) f g(v)dv is the revenue from fines collected at
enforcement level (c, f ), the expression h
∫ ∞
p(c) f g(v)dv has two possible interpreta-
tions: If the harm is a public harm, meaning all agents are affected by each harmful
activity, then h
∫ ∞
p(c) f g(v)dv is the total harm in the society caused by agents engaged
in the harmful activity at enforcement level (c, f ). If the harm is a private harm, mean-
ing a random agent is offended by each harmful activity, and each agent is equally
likely to be affected by each harmful activity, then h
∫ ∞
p(c) f g(v)dv is the expected total
harm each agent faces caused by agents engaged in the harmful activity at enforcement
level (c, f ).6
Given the probability of detection p(c) and fine level f , an enforcement equilib-
rium is a set of actions {a∗i }i∈[0,1] such that for each agent i action a∗i , which represents
engaging or not engaging in the act, maximizes his utility. Observe that when equi-
librium expected utility in Eq. 1 is integrated over all agents, the resulting equation is
the social welfare in the society
∞∫
p(c) f
(v − h) g(v)dv − c
and it is identical to the social welfare in Polinsky and Shavell (2007), Equation 13.
Lemmas 1 and 2 below show that for any two agents, their marginal equilibrium
expected utilities are identical at enforcement levels (c, f ) where they make the same
decision about engaging in harmful activity.
Lemma 1 Given fine level f , for each agent i, j ∈ [0, 1] such that vi < v j , and for
each level of enforcement expenditure c such that p(c) f ∈ (0, vi )∪(v j ,∞), marginal
5 I would like to thank Andy McLennan for suggesting this term.
6 For more on private versus public harms see, for example, Bator (1958), Head (1962), and Baumol and
Oates (1988).
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Proof Observe that from Eq. 1 for each agent i ∈ [0, 1], his marginal equilibrium
expected utility with respect to c at each enforcement level (c, f ) such that i engages
in the harmful activity, i.e. p(c) f < vi , is
∂Eu∗i
∂c
= (p′(c) f )[(h − p(c) f ) g(p(c) f ) − G(p(c) f )] − 1,
and his marginal equilibrium expected utility with respect to c at each enforcement
level (c, f ) such that i does not engage in the harmful activity, i.e. p(c) f > vi , is
∂Eu∗i
∂c
= (p′(c) f )[(h − p(c) f ) g(p(c) f ) + 1 − G(p(c) f )] − 1.
Hence, if p(c) f ∈ (0, vi ) ∪ (v j ,∞), then agents i and j have identical marginal
















Lemma 2 Given enforcement expenditure c, for each agent i, j ∈ [0, 1] such that
vi < v j , and for each level of fine f such that p(c) f ∈ (0, vi ) ∪ (v j ,∞), marginal
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Proof Observe that from Eq. 1 for each agent i ∈ [0, 1], his marginal equilibrium
expected utility with respect to f at enforcement level (c, f ) such that i engages in
the harmful activity, i.e. p(c) f < vi , is
∂Eu∗i
∂ f
= p(c) [(h − p(c) f ) g (p(c) f ) − G (p(c) f )] ,
and his marginal equilibrium expected utility at each enforcement level (c, f ) such
that i does not engage in the harmful activity, i.e. p(c) f > vi , is
∂Eu∗i
∂ f
= p(c)[(h − p(c) f ) g(p(c) f ) + 1 − G(p(c) f )].
Hence, if p(c) f ∈ (0, vi ) ∪ (v j ,∞), then agents i and j have identical marginal
















Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that for each agent i, j ∈ [0, 1] such that vi < v j , and at
each enforcement expenditure c and fine level f such that p(c) f ∈ [0, vi )∪ (v j ,∞),
equilibrium expected utilities of i and j change in the same direction when c or f
changes. An immediate consequence of these lemmas, Theorem 1 below states that
in a given society, in equilibrium there do not exist two agents such that when one
always prefers higher monitoring (fine) to lower monitoring (fine), the other always
prefers lower monitoring (fine) to higher monitoring (fine). Hence, the impossibility
of the existence of opposite equilibrium preferences on law enforcement emerges.
Theorem 1 There do not exist agents i, j ∈ [0, 1] such that agent i’s equilibrium
expected utility is monotone increasing in enforcement expenditure c (fine f ) whereas
agent j’s equilibrium expected utility is monotone decreasing in enforcement expen-
diture c (fine f ).
According to the median voter theorem, the median voter’s most preferred alter-
native is the winner of the majority voting on each pair of alternatives. There
are two conditions frequently used in the literature for the median voter theorem:
Single-peakedness condition on preferences, and single-crossing property of pref-
erence profiles: Agent i has single-peaked preferences (in the current environment)
if there exists an alternative c such that for each c′ < c′′ < c or c′ > c′′ > c,
Eu∗i (c′) < Eu∗i (c′′) < Eu∗i (c). A preference profile satisfies single-crossing prop-
erty (in the current environment) if for each alternative c′ > c and for each agent
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vi ′ > vi , Eu∗i (c′) ≥ Eu∗i (c) implies that Eu∗i ′(c′) ≥ Eu∗i ′(c), and Eu∗i (c′) > Eu∗i (c)
implies that Eu∗i ′(c
′) > Eu∗i ′(c). The example below provides insight to the nature of
violation of these conditions in the enforcement environment.
Example 1 Let the probability of detection be p(c) = c, and the probability distrib-
ution of values be g(v) = 10−v50 for v ∈ [0, 10] and g(v) = 0 for v /∈ [0, 10]. Then,
agent i’s equilibrium expected utility at enforcement level (c, f ) is



















Assume that the harm level h = 3 and fine level f = 7. For any agent, the peak
of his preferences (the maximum of the equilibrium expected utility function) is at
c∗1 ≈ 0.15 if he decides to involve in the harmful act, and the peak is at c∗2 ≈ 0.63
if he decides not to involve in the act. For any agent i such that vi ≤ c∗1 f or vi ≥
c∗2 f , agent i has single-peaked preferences over enforcement expenditure c such that
for each c ≤ vif , Eu∗i = vi − c f − c + (c f − h) (10−c f )
2
100 , and for each c ≥ vif ,
Eu∗i = −c + (c f − h) (10−c f )
2
100 . For any agent i such that vi ∈ (c∗1 f, c∗2 f ), agent
i has double-peaked preferences over enforcement expenditure c. Moreover, single-
crossing property is not satisfied either: for vi = 0.1, Eu∗i (0.4) > Eu∗i (0.3), but for
v j = 3.5 > vi , Eu∗i (0.4) < Eu∗i (0.3).
3 General enforcement
In the general enforcement model (see Polinsky and Shavell (1992)), agents are risk-
neutral and they choose whether to commit a harmful act or not. Agent i ∈ [0, 1]
receives benefit vi ≥ 0 from the act, and benefits are randomly distributed with an
integrable probability density function g(·) whose cumulative distribution function
is G(·). The harm caused by agent i’s act, hi ≥ 0 is randomly distributed with an
integrable probability density function r(·) whose cumulative distribution function is
R(·). Distributions g(·) and r(·) are assumed to be independent. Fine schedule f (·)
assigns a fine to each harm level h such that 0 ≤ f (h) ≤ w, where w represents
agents’ wealth.
When the expenditure on enforcement is c ≥ 0, the probability of detection is
p(c) ∈ [0, 1]. When agent i is caught (with probability p(c)), he pays a fine f (hi ). In
addition to the fixed cost c of enforcement, there is also variable cost of enforcement,
k ≥ 0. Whenever an offender is caught, k is the cost of fining that agent. Given the
probability of detection p(c) and the fine schedule f (·), agent i decides to commit an
act if vi ≥ p(c) f (hi ).
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Given the enforcement expenditure c, social welfare in this model (see Polinsky





(v − h − p(c) k) g(v) r(h) dv dh − c. (2)
Given the probability of detection p(c), the optimal fine schedule f (·) is such that
for each harm level h it maximizes
∞∫
p(c) f (h)
(v − h − p(c) k) g(v) dv.
Hence, by Polinsky and Shavell (1992) (Proposition 1) the optimal fine schedule is
f ∗(hi ) =
{
k + hip(c) if hi ≤ p(c) (w − k),
w if hi > p(c) (w − k).
(3)
Observe that given the enforcement expenditure c, the optimal fine schedule f ∗(·)
is strictly monotone increasing in harm levels up to some level after which fines of all
harms equal w.
Given enforcement expenditure c, social welfare in Eq. 2 becomes (see Polinsky











(v − h − p(c) k) g(v) r(h) dv dh − c.
Given the probability of detection p(c) and the corresponding optimal fine schedule
f ∗(·) from Eq. 3, agent i benefiting vi from the act and causing the harm hi commits
the act if vi ≥ p(c) f ∗(hi ). So, agent i’s equilibrium expected utility is












(−h − p(c) k + p(c) f ∗(h)) g(v) r(h) dv dh − c. (4)
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Proposition 1 below gives the equilibrium expected utility when the optimal fine
schedule f ∗(·) is substituted into Eq. 4.
Proposition 1 Each agent i’s equilibrium expected utility is
Eu∗i = max{0, vi − p(c) f ∗(hi )}
+
(
1 − G(p(c) w))
⎡
⎢⎣p(c) (w − k)
(






⎥⎦ − c. (5)
Proof By Eqs. 3 and 4,












(−h − p(c) k + p(c) w) g(v) r(h) dv dh − c






(−h − p(c) k + p(c) w) g(v) r(h) dv dh − c
= max{0, vi − p(c) f ∗(hi )}
+[1 − G(p(c) w)]
∞∫
p(c) (w−k)
(−h − p(c) k + p(c) w) r(h) dh − c
= max{0, vi − p(c) f ∗(hi )}
+
(
1 − G(p(c) w))
⎡
⎢⎣p(c) (w − k)
(
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Lemma 3 Given fine level f , for each agent i, j ∈ [0, 1] and for each level of enforce-
ment expenditure c satisfying one of the following conditions:
(i) hi , h j > p(c)(w − k) and vi , v j ≥ p(c)w,
(ii) hi , h j ≤ p(c)(w − k) and vi ≥ p(c)k + hi and v j ≥ p(c)k + h j ,
(iii) vi , v j < p(c)w,









Proof From Eq. 5
∂Eu∗i
∂c





− p′(c) wg(p(c) w))
[
p(c) (w − k)
(












1 − R(p(c) (w − k)))
+ p(c) (w − k)
(
− p′(c) (w − k) r(p(c) (w − k)))
+ p(c) (w − k) r(p(c) (w − k)) p′(c) (w − k)
]
− 1










⎢⎣p(c) (w − k)
(









1 − G(p(c) w))
[
(w − k) p′(c)
(
1 − R(p(c) (w − k)))
]
− 1.
Observe that if condition i. holds, then
∂ max{0, vi − p(c) f ∗(hi )}
∂c
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if condition ii. holds, then
∂ max{0, vi − p(c) f ∗(hi )}
∂c




and if condition iii. holds, then
∂ max{0, vi − p(c) f ∗(hi )}
∂c




Since by Eq. 5
∂Eu∗i
∂c − ∂ max{0,vi−p(c) f
∗(hi )}
∂c is equal for all agents, the result holds. unionsq
Theorem 2, an immediate consequence of Lemma 3, states that in a given soci-
ety, in equilibrium there do not exist two agents such that when one always prefers
higher monitoring to lower monitoring, the other always prefers lower monitoring
to higher monitoring. Hence, the impossibility of the existence of opposite equilib-
rium preferences on law enforcement emerges in the general enforcement model as
well.
Theorem 2 There do not exist agents i, j ∈ [0, 1] such that agent i’s equilibrium
expected utility is monotone increasing in enforcement expenditure c whereas agent
j’s equilibrium expected utility is monotone decreasing in enforcement expenditure c.
4 Conclusion
Majority voting is one of the methods used in many economic environments to deter-
mine a policy for a society. It is also used in law enforcement models along with the
application of the median voter theorem in these environments. In these models, in
order to apply themedian voter theorem either the single-peaked preferences or single-
crossing property of preference profiles are assumed. In this paper, I demonstrate that
these assumptions are often violated. Moreover, in law enforcement environments,
agents cannot have opposite preferences over enforcement levels. These results imply
that it may be necessary to rethink current approaches in economics of law enforce-
ment.
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